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Abstract 
Development being critically dependent upon the import of crude oil, India entered into regional trade agreements with West 
Asian states, particularly Iran. India signed RTA with Iran because its terms of trade seemed advantageous to others. Besides, a 
curious trend was observed that a rising GDP was related to a growing total trade growth rate between India- Iran. At present, 
India’s fallen GDP coincides with India’s reduced oil import from Iran. Due to the Iranian nuclear crisis, India has been under 
immense external pressure to halt oil trade Iran which can, consequently, stifle development. India’s response has revealed its 
unique trade diplomacy-‘inclusive alignment’, especially useful in troubled political climes. Inclusive alignment refers to 
alignment to both powers. Thereby, it does not commit oneself to a singular bloc. Thereby, one could maintain one’s neutrality 
and balance against the US-led sanctions against Iran, and continue Iranian oil imports.  
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1. Introduction 
Unquestionably, at the core of India’s economic development is oil. Oil is a critical component not only for 
economic growth or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also for economic development- it fuels important 
economic sectors such as industries, agriculture, transport which has strong implications on social development such 
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as standard of living, poverty, food security and more. Yet, one of the world’s emerging economies and growing 
populous countries suffer from increasing energy deficits due to stagnant domestic production of crude oil (Rekha 
2012). Therefore, India relies heavily on import of crude oil, particularly from West Asia- Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iraq- which accounts for three-fourths of the total import of 75% (Rekha 2012). Oil trade agreements and diplomacy 
become essential to secure reliable suppliers. India has regional trade agreements with the Gulf Cooperation 
Countries (GCC) which witnessed rising imports of oil and gas as well as bilateral trade amounting to US$ 45.36 
billion from 2011-2012 (Embassy of India, Riyadh, 2012). Furthermore, India has also free trade agreements with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran which led to oil imports worth 14.689 million tonnes from 2011-2012 as well as 
bilateral trade worth US $ 15,968.03 million in the same year (Roy, 2013). As far back as 1960s, the Indian state-
enterprise Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) concluded agreements with the Iranian National Oil Company 
(INOC) for joint oil exploration in the Iranian offshore, and the construction of a refinery with guaranteed long-term 
supply of crude oil in Madras (present day Chennai) (Dasgupta, 1977). Hence, it has been rightly said that India’s 
economic development in contingent upon ‘politics and diplomacy’ (Dasgupta, 1977: 72).  
Economic development is strongly correlated with oil availability and affordability. In other words, it is 
susceptible to oil supply shock. The nature and source of oil supply shock can lead to both changes in terms of trade 
and fall in output of oil-importing country with related consequences for economic growth and development 
(Backus and Crucini, 2000). In comparison with other West Asian states, Iran supplies oil highly suitable for India’s 
refineries, industries and more. However, Iran’s nuclear program has not only triggered international political crisis 
but also imposed trade sanctions on and penalties for trade with the ‘rogue’ state (BBC, 2001). Thereafter, India has 
been under immense external pressure notably from the global power, the United States (US), to halt oil trade Iran 
which can stifle growth and development.  
Since the end of last century, India and the US have engaged in several domains under the banner of ‘Global 
Partnership’ (Burns et al., 2006). Despite India’s deepening ties with the US, India has maintained trade relations 
with Iran. This paper is divided into two sections- the first section is devoted to understand India- Iran Regional 
Trade Agreement (RTA), and the last section is devoted to explain India’s unique response to mounting 
international pressure- the trade diplomacy of ‘inclusive alignment’ especially useful in troubled political climes. 
2. Regional Trade Agreement: India- Iran Preferential Trade  
States enter into RTAs for greater trade benefits from the regional trading partners (EXPORT-IMPORT BANK 
OF INDIA, 2007). The conventional logic behind RTAs is ‘reciprocal exchanges of concessions on trade 
barriers…improvements in market access from which all parties to the negotiation will benefit’ (Whalley, 1998: 71). 
States engage RTAs when ‘chances of success are seen as high because the number of countries is small, or there 
has been a prior history of frustration with negotiating failures at the multilateral level’ (Whalley, 1998: 71). 
Furthermore, states enter into RTAs either through membership in a regional trade bloc or through bilateral 
negotiations.  
Under the World Trade Organisation’s list of notified Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), India and Iran are 
signatories to the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP) which entered into 
force on 19 April 1989. Hence, the India-Iran RTA is based on bilateral trade agreements. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (Government of India) has also signed the ‘Framework Agreement on Economic 
Cooperation between Republic of India and Gulf Cooperation Council’ on 25 August 2004 while the Confederation 
of Indian Industries hopes that India and the GCC will sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2013 (PTI, 2012). 
From the perspective of India, RTAs in West Asia, the region with ‘81% of the world’s proven oil reserves’ (OPEC, 
2013), will contribute to energy security. As said earlier, India has a stagnant domestic production of crude oil 
(Rekha 2012). Between 2011-2012, India barely produced 1% more than the previous year so that it recorded 
7,63,000 barrels per day (Merchant, 2012). With 75%- 80% of the country's total oil requirements being met through 
imports or RTAs,  
- It assures guarantee of access  
- It inflates the total trade deficit  
- It encourages market competitiveness  
- It initiates cooperation in other fields such as politics, security  
 
238   Sanghamitra Nath /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  157 ( 2014 )  236 – 243 
From the perspective of the West Asian countries, India provides huge market to sell oil wherein trade is in their 
favour. The trade imbalance, while negative for India, is positive for them. Compared to the countries in the GCC, 
Iran offers better terms of trade to India. For India, oil import from Iran is crucial because of its quality and credit 
facility. The Iranian crude oil is a light variety quite suitable for Indian refineries while that from Saudi Arabia is 
heavy and a wrong substitute (Ranjan, 2013). Moreover, Iran offers a 90-day credit line as against the 30-day credit 
line by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries (Ranjan, 2013). Furthermore, a curious trend is observed 
between India’s GDP and total trade growth rate between India- Iran. 
 
Table 1: Trends in India-Iran Bilateral Trade (figures in Million US$) 
Year  India’s exports to 
Iran  
India’s imports  
from Iran  
Total trade  Trade balance  Total trade  
growth rate (%)  
2005-06  1187.71  4822.65  6011.36  -3633.94  44.39  
2006-07  1490.99  7839.08  9330.07  -6348.09  55.20  
2007-08  1943.91  10889.57  12833.48  -8945.66  37.55  
2008-09  2534.01  12376.77  14910.78  -9842.76  16.19  
2009-10  1853.17  11540.85  13394.02  -9687.68  -10.17  
(Source: 1. Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India; 2) Sujata Ashwarya Cheema (2012),India’s Approach to  
Sanctions on Iran, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/29/indias-approach-to-sanctions-on-iran/, accessed on 13 October 2013) 
 
From 2005-2006, India registered a GDP of 8.4 per cent (PTI, 2006) while the total trade growth rate between 
India- Iran was 44.39%. From 2006-2007, India’s GDP grew to 8.9% (PTI, 2006) while the total trade reached 
55.20%. From 2007-2008, India’s GDP fell to 7% (IMF, 2010; Mani 2010) with a corresponding drop in total trade 
to 37.55%. From 2008-2009, the country’s GDP further fell to 6% IMF, 2010; Mani 2010) and so did the total trade 
to 16.19%. This correlation shows that India’s GDP is related to total trade growth rate with Iran. In other words, 
India’s economic growth is dependent on trade with Iran, especially oil import from Iran. This re-iterates the 
importance of Iran to India as compared to other West Asian states. Between 2008-2009, India increased its oil 
imports from Iran to 9.5% (Press TV, 2009). In 2013, India’s GDP has fallen to 4.4% and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) forecasts the economic growth for 2013-14 to 4.7 per cent (Srivats 2013). Since 2012-2013, India had 
to cut down overall oil imports from Iran by 21.8% between April 2012 and January 2013 (Arab News, 2013). 
Furthermore, the total shipment of crude oil from Iran had declined from 486,600 barrels per day (bpd) to 286,400 
bpd within a year (Arab News, 2013). Thereby, Iran has slipped to the sixth place in 2013 as against the third place it 
held in 2012 among oil suppliers. 
3. Understanding Inclusive Diplomacy: India’s Inclusive Alignment  
The Iranian nuclear crisis seems to have left no country untouched. The crisis seems to have dragged even those 
countries which were unconnected and far removed from it. The crisis also seems to have divided the international 
community into two halves- one led by the United States (US) and supported by European Union and Israel, and the 
other occupied by Iran. With most of the world’s economies integrated with the US and utilise the US dollar as the 
standard currency for international exchange is, it is no wonder that most countries are heavily tilted towards the US. 
And yet, there are countries which have maintained links with both camps such as India, South Korea, Turkey, 
South Africa, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. In this paper, the author shall restrict the discussion to India and its 
diplomacy with the West Asian strategic partner for economic growth and development- Iran.  
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, in his thought-provoking work Still Under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign 
Policy Frameworks in India (2009), said that India’s foreign policy was shaped by its conception of national 
identity. The national identity which emerged post-independence from British imperialism comprised ‘the language 
of idealism, the support for a norm based international society and the avoidance of getting entangled in conflicts”, 
and during the Cold War it “made a lot of sense’ (Mehta, 2009: 211). This national identity was captured by India’s 
first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, as ‘non-alignment’. Thereafter, Mehta discussed an important observation 
on India’s foreign policy framework, ‘an absence of long term strategic thinking’ (Mehta, 2009: 210). Since Nehru’s 
conception of ‘non-alignment’, there has not been much change in India’s diplomatic stance till today. In difficult 
situations created by international politics, India has applied the diplomatic stance of ‘non-alignment’ time and 
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again. When India got dragged into the Iranian nuclear crisis, it recalled the diplomatic stance of ‘non-alignment’ to 
avoid much entanglement at the cost of its national interests.  
However, India’s diplomatic stance of ‘non-alignment’ is not exactly the same today as it was during the 
Nehruvian era. While the ‘non-alignment’ during the Cold War may be termed as ‘exclusive alignment’, post- Cold 
War it may be termed as ‘inclusive alignment’. Exclusive alignment referred to India’s unwillingness to join either 
the Soviet bloc or the US bloc during the Cold War. Inclusive alignment referred to India’s willingness to develop 
friendly relations, without any bias, with other sovereign states in the international community for the achievement 
of its national interests. Today, India maintains cordial relations not only with Russia but also with US. In the 
current crisis too, India has maintained peaceful diplomatic relations with both US and Iran. The purpose of this 
paper is to understand the diplomatic stance of ‘non-alignment’ with the globalization of economies. To put simply, 
the aim of this paper is to explain the diplomacy of ‘inclusive alignment’ as a component of the over-arching 
framework of ‘non-alignment’. This section is sub-divided into three sections. The following sections shall 
introduce the concept as well as the context of India’s inclusive alignment, and the application of inclusive 
alignment to Iran.  
4. The Concept of Inclusive Diplomacy  
The concept of inclusive diplomacy is a form of ‘Non-Alignment’ diplomacy, wherein it is ‘an instrument of 
foreign policy evolved through continuous interaction with domestic circumstances and the external 
environment...to follow an independent foreign policy’ (Harshe, 1990:399). In 1954, the term ‘Non- alignment’ was 
first introduced by Jawaharlal Nehru (India) in Sri Lanka. Soon it was developed into a policy and a diplomatic 
strategy by Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Josip Bros Tito 
(Yugoslavia) and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana). During the Cold War, non-alignment provided an innovative choice to 
the prevalent tendencies of states to join a superpower bloc, either the United States (US) or the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR). Non-alignment provided the alternative to ‘steer clear of power politics’ by refusing to 
commit to any of the ‘two mutually hostile camps led by the superpowers’ (Harshe, 1990: 399). India, as a founding 
member of non-alignment, could avoid being drawn into superpower rivalry and pursue its plans of modernization 
and development.  
Yet, India’s non-alignment policy is puzzling. During the Second Five-Year Plan, India accepted USSR’s aid to 
build steel plants. Further, the USSR used its veto in the United Nations security Council on the Kashmir issue in 
favour of India. On 9 August 1971, India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation with USSR and 
simultaneously, it sought US’ military assistance to save itself against China in the 1962 war. The US willingly 
supported India to counter an expansionist Communist China and to ‘tilt India's non-alignment towards the west’ 
(Harshe, 1990: 401). In an article by the Times of India, it was revealed that ‘Jawaharlal Nehru pleaded for US help 
against China in 1962’ (2010) which questions India’s policy and diplomatic strategy of non-alignment. Such 
diplomatic alliances attract views such as ‘In theory, India has always maintained the so-called equidistance between 
the US and the USSR, though in practice, what it has achieved is the status of a client state indebted to both the 
powers’ (Reviewed work in EPW, 1978).  
Inclusive diplomacy begins from the above-mentioned critique of India’s non-alignment diplomacy. The manner 
in which non-alignment was practiced was negative alignment or an abstention from alignment with any of the super 
powers of the Cold War era. Negative alignment, thereby, could also be called exclusive diplomacy as it excluded 
normal diplomacy with the super powers. Thus, in the Cold War era non-alignment seemed to be synonymous 
with exclusive diplomacy. Hence, any alignment was seen as an exception.  
However, complete abstention need not be the only means to achieve non-alignment. Non-alignment may also be 
possible by aligning with both super powers. By aligning with both super powers, one does not commit oneself to a 
singular bloc. Thereby, one maintained one’s neutrality. In fact, abstention of both amounts to an extreme stance 
while alignment to both amounts to impartial approach or the ‘middle path’. Middle path diplomacy not only 
enables diplomatic relations with multiple states but also provides flexibility in decision-making and bargaining. 
The middle path strategy can be called as positive alignment which offsets the earlier narrow interpretation of 
non-alignment and its exceptions. As positive alignment makes it possible to establish interactions with as 
many states in the international system as it seems fit, it is also called inclusive diplomacy. Inclusive 
diplomacy only reinforces non-alignment, in policy and strategy. At present, India strongly seems to be pursuing 
inclusive diplomacy and therefore, a form of non-alignment diplomacy.  
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With the end of Cold War and the collapse of USSR, US emerged as the unipole. In recent times, the global 
supremacy of the unipole is being challenged by revisionist states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and People’s 
Republic of China. While it is true that Post Cold War there has not been a single strong challenger such as the once 
USSR, there are multiple rivals to US hegemony. In this paper, the focus shall be on Iran and its accelerating nuclear 
programme. Given its hostility with the US, a nuclear-armed Iran is a grave threat to the unipole’s security and 
status. Of late, US-led international politics requires states to isolate Iran so that it may tame its ambitions and 
adhere to the rules under Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is explicit pressure on states to break off 
economic ties with Iran. This posture translates into US versus Iran alignment and the unipole has already threatened 
the loss of access to American banking system as punishment for states which align with Iran. India is dependent on 
the US and the Iran for material reasons such as civilian nuclear energy and oil respectively. India’s base structure is 
tied to that of US and Iran. In such a scenario, India is following inclusive diplomacy.  
5. The Context of Inclusive Diplomacy  
The US-Iran relations have been tense from 1979. With the Iranian Revolution and the removal of Reza Shah 
Pahlavi, the US had cut off diplomatic ties with Iran. The Iranian nuclear crisis started in 2002 when news spread 
that Iran had two unreported nuclear facilities. These were the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy 
water production plant at Arak. The following year the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‘discovered 
highly enriched uranium at one of Iran’s nuclear facilities and complained that Iran had hidden parts of its nuclear 
program from inspectors’ (European Union Center 2008:3).This triggered the suspicion that Iran might be in pursuit 
of a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, the construction of a new enrichment plant raised further suspicions. 
Iran argued that it need not notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of any such construction but the 
IAEA insisted that Iran was legally obliged to declare such intensions to build confidence regarding the peaceful 
nature of its nuclear activities. Thereby, the IAEA asserted that Iran must adhere to the modified Code 3.1 of the 
Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement but Iran rejected the same (Albright and 
Stricker, 2012).  
A host of sanctions have been imposed on Iran from 2006 by the United Nations and individual sovereign states. 
These include the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 1984, and 2049. 
Unilateral sanctions have also been imposed against Iran by the US and European Union (EU). The Bush 
administration believed that a nation rich with hydro-carbons had no need for a civilian nuclear programme. It 
defied logic. From 2012, India and another six states mentioned earlier got dragged into the conflict between US 
(coercer) and Iran (target). For economic sanctions against Iran to be resolute, it must be supported and implemented 
by US allies, friends and partners. This means that the allies, friends and partners have to change their normal course 
of action to accommodate the unilateral sanctions levied by the US. In other words, the US must ‘get the other actor 
to change its course of action, and that is why it turns to linkage politics’ (Stein, 1980: 65).  
Since 2005 India and US have entered into ‘Global Partnership’. The US believes that strengthening New Delhi 
will bring only benefits for Asian stability and American security (Tellis, 2005). This implies that New Delhi India 
must cooperate with the US in pressurising Iran. It is through multilateral cooperation that the coerciveness of 
sanctions will be possible to realise. The problem is that the Indian economy is highly dependent on Iranian oil. 
India’s economic interest will suffer if it accommodates the US’ dominant strategy of complete halt of Iranian oil 
imports. In late March 2013, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister, Veerappa Moily, made it clear that India does 
not intend to halt oil imports from Iran. Then how did India manage to still keep its relation with the US un-
fractured? Through inclusive diplomacy.  
6. India’s inclusive diplomacy with the Iran  
With the case of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis, India’s inclusive diplomacy came to be tested. At the IAEA, India 
voted against Iran (The Hindu, 2009) but prior to the vote, the Indian Prime Minister (PM), Manmohan Singh, 
discussed India’s voting preference with the Congress party president Sonia Gandhi, Finance Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee and External Affairs Minister S M Krishna. The PM justified his vote in favour of the US (co-sponsored) 
resolution at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), on the grounds that India does not support Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions or its violation of the NPT (The Hindu, 2009).  
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In 2013, the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in India for a three-day visit. She agreed to 
India’s decision of reduced Iranian imports. However, she pressed India to further cut down its oil imports from Iran 
to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program. As India imported 12% of crude oil from Iran, top-importers such as 
Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd (MRPL) and Essar Oil would be required to decrease their oil imports 
by 15%-20% (Indian Express, 2013). Therefore, MRPL intended to buy less than 100,000 barrels per day from 
142,000 bpd while Essar Oil contemplated to buy 85,000 bpd from 100,000 bpd (Quinn, 2013). The US even 
offered to broker deals with alternative suppliers of crude oil such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia (BLOOMBERG, 2012). 
Such measures pacified the US.  
Post-Iranian Revolution, Iran has been a member of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). Since then Iran has 
been averse to US in the belief it represents the ‘Great Satan’ (Black, 2008). Iran was also distant from USSR 
because its communist ideology was atheistic. Therefore, it was in contrast with the Shi’a Islamic state of Iran. India 
and Iran have reasons to cooperate  
- Their affiliation to the same institution of non-alignment movement  
- India has the largest population of Shi’s Muslims in South Asia which has serious implications for India-Iran 
diplomacy  
- Bilateral relations extend to the Neolithic Age  
After India’s voting against Iran at the IAEA under the pressure of US, the Indian government decided to 
increase economic and commercial engagement with Iran through joint investment in infrastructure and joint 
exploration of oil (PTI, 2013). The External Affairs Minister, Salman Khurshid, offered Iran’s Ali Akbar Salehi to 
pursue joint exploration and Production Sharing Agreement in an oil block. Hence, the Iranian Oil Minister would be 
visiting India soon. Moreover, India announced that it would contribute to the development of the Chabahar port in 
Iran (Aneja, 2013). India is a willing participant in the trilateral arrangement for the development of Iran's 
Chahbahar port with a related investment of around US$100 million. Given the Chahbahar port’s strategic location, 
the investment will serve India’s national interest. For Iran, India’s cooperation particularly at the time of economic 
and political crisis is significant. The primary survival of Iran’s economy depends on the export of oil and natural 
gas. As the sanctions prevent states from buying Iranian oil and natural gas, it hurts the Iranian economy directly. An 
additional outcome of the sanctions is the extreme devaluation of its currency. The currency lost 80% of its value in 
the midst of the sanctions.  
India-Iran trade diplomacy has a long history. Prior to the diplomatic visits by dignitaries of India and Iran in 
2013, business delegations of each country were engaged in conferences to improve bilateral trade between them. 
The FIEO had invited an eight-member business delegation from Iran on July 20, 2012 at New Delhi. The Iranian 
delegation was headed by Mr. S. Afgheh, Managing Director, Kalanaft, National Iranian Oil Company. The purpose 
of the meeting was to build business ties with the Indian oil and gas field services and equipment companies. The 
delegation showed business interest had business interest in pumps; electrical equipments, gas turbines, drilling bits, 
casting in different sizes, gas compressors; rigs, line pipes, valves, lab equipments and so on. Therefore, Mr. M. 
Pakparwar, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Iran, New Delhi, believed that India, being an important trading 
partners of Iran, could make exports worth $5-7 billion to cover up the trade imbalance. He suggested that both the 
countries should make their presence in international exhibitions in India and Iran to boost their bilateral trade. He 
also encouraged Indian companies to invest in Iran and use the Special Economic Zones to channel Indian exports to 
Iran (Federation of Indian Export Organisation, 2012). 
In the face of sanctions, the Indian and Iranian governments have been trying to find methods to meet mutual 
expectations of interests. On March 2012, a high-level delegation of Indian officials and businessmen went to 
Tehran to agree on the mode of payment due to the restriction on the use of US dollars and large sums of payment 
pending on both sides. After the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) refused to operate the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) 
mechanism and under which payments were made to Iran, India continued to import oil on credit and adding on the 
already outstanding amount worth $3 billion. Besides, a new set of US sanctions against Iran ended an 18-month old 
arrangement for payment of Iranian crude oil through Ankara-based Turkiye Halk Bankasi (Press Trust of India, 
2013). Both Indian and Iranian sides agreed to use the rupee for the purpose of exchange. The rupee payment 
mechanism would be operationalised via the UCO Bank, Kolkata, India. The Central Bank of Iran has opened an 
account with UCO bank and other Indian banks to facilitate the payment as well as to buy commodities and products 
from India. Besides, the rupee payment mechanism would aggressively promote Indian exports to Iran to offset the 
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trade imbalance by oil imports. However, the rupee payment would constitute 45% of the transaction while the 
remaining would be paid through other modes to Iran. The Iranian Ambassador to India, Mr Seyed Mehdi 
Nabizadeh, said at a press conference in New Delhi that Iran was agreeable to India’s method of payment-part cash 
and part non-cash- to settle the oil debts and trade imbalance. The non-cash exportable items would include 
pharmaceuticals and soymeals. According to Reuters Middle East report, India’s export of soymeal to Iran increased 
sharply in early 2013 despite high prices of around $585 a ton (as on April 4 2013). Thereby, India exported 142,000 
tonnes of the animal feed to Iran in March 2013 as against only 40,000 tonnes in March 2012. Since the sanctions do 
not include food shipments, India is using soymeal as a means of payment for crude oil imports.  
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, the aim was to explain India- Iran RTA and India’s current diplomacy of ‘inclusive alignment’ as a 
form of ‘non-alignment’ within the context of the Iranian nuclear crisis. India signed RTA with Iran because it 
offered a 90-day credit line and a light variety of oil suitable for Indian refineries. In comparison to others such as 
the GCC, Iran’s terms of trade seemed advantageous. Besides, a curious trend was observed between India’s GDP 
and total trade growth rate between India- Iran. A rising GDP was related to a growing total trade growth rate 
between India- Iran. At present, India’s fallen GDP coincides with India’s reduced oil import from Iran. The reduced 
import was the product of trade negotiations with the US which initially required complete halt of oil imports. The 
issue of reduced import reflected India’s inclusive diplomacy whereby it could pacify the US as well as continue oil 
import from Iran. By aligning with both powers, US and Iran, India does not commit oneself to a singular bloc. 
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